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PREFACE 
A review of the complex situation that exists in China, especialJy 
as it relates to foreign affairs, is most welcome while the Report of 
the Commission on Extraterritoriality is still being discussed and 
when every day brings news of military conflict in China. To pre-
sent such a review, Professor Harold S. Quigley, of the University 
of Minnesota, has kindly consented to extend for publication in its 
present form the following admirable article, already published in 
part both in the United States and in England. He has also provided 
a SyJlabus on Recent Chinese Politics and Diplomacy which will be 
found at the end of this document. Farther references have also been 
given as to sources of information on Chinese affairs. Professor 
Quigley speaks with authority as a student of Far Eastern Politics 
and as a former member of the faculty of the Tsing Hua CoJlege at 
Peking. It is believed that this document will prove to be both in-
teresting and informing and also serve as a permanent source of 
reference. 
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER 
New York, January 5, 1927. 
CHINESE POLITICS A D FOREIGN POWERSr 
BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY 
Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota 
What has not been true since Tao Kuang is true today-that the 
most important factor in the Far Eastern situation is China. In 
spite of her continued weakness as a military power, of her disunity 
and her lack of political morale, China today is exhibiting a foreign 
policy of her own and her policy is receiving attention on its merits. 
That does not mean necessarily that her policy will succeed in part 
or entire, any more than it would mean such a result for any other 
country which exhibited a policy. But it is an important step for 
China that her policies should be receiving equal consideration with 
those of other countries. 
The question of what influences have been effective in bringing 
about this changed status is one of the highest interest. Perhaps 
it is merely a commonplace to give the most prominent position to 
the spread of education and the consequent growth of national con-
sciousness and national feeling. This development has had two re-
sults: it has provided trained diplomats and it has stimulated a pub-
lic opinion to support their moves. Not that China did not have 
trained diplomats in earlier days; but she required men who knew 
foreign countries and foreign languages. Such men she obtained and 
to them she owes a heavy debt for their suave presentation of facts, 
near-facts and plausibilities. With disorder verging upon anarchy at 
home these men have so conducted themselves as to win the good-
will of foreign peoples and have so presented the issues affecting their 
country as to magnify China's efforts at reform and minimize the 
work of her agents of destruction. Wherein they have simply fol-
lowed precedent, for it has ever been a poor diplomat who would 
expose his country to the laughter of other peoples. And, force 
aside, what an enviable position as fencers they have enjoyed and 
what satisfaction they must have felt while delicately referring to 
this, that, and the other depredation and indignity that the govern-
ment and countrymen of their hosts had put upon them. In most 
1Printed in part in Current Histary, September, 1926 and in the Contemporary Review 
(London), November, 1926. 
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cases of the sort the retort courteous might have been in order, but 
in China's case the impositions have been unilateral. 
Some would say that there is no such thing as public opinion in 
China. But what is public opinion in any country? It is not like 
a system of water-mains or electricity, out of which water or light 
may be obtained by turning a spigot or a button. Public opinion 
is not always sentient on current issues, because it is never fully 
informed and because it is never sufficiently interested. It is i:nore 
like an old-fashioned automobile that has to be .cranked, possibly 
primed, to be gotten to work. The leaders of opinion must do the 
cranking in America and in Europe as well as in China. And it may 
be doubted whether the Western populace is better prepared to 
react sanely to propaganda than the Chinese. But granted that 
its superior education is a better basis for judgment than Chinese 
traditions, the fact remains that popular judgments are worked up in 
the West quite as obviously as they are in the East. 
The other of the principal influences working in China's favor has 
been the development of economic imperialism. The open door and 
the integrity of China policies embody this development and they 
have been effective just so far as they have expressed the interests 
of their exponents. Where they have not functioned properly it 
has been because other policies have overcome them in the presence 
of interests amounting to necessities both in their opponents and 
their supporters. Time has worked in China's favor in the applica-
tion of these policies since with the passage of time the accumulation 
of capital and the growth of industrialism have become more and 
more remarkable and more and more widespread. A century ago 
one country could dominate the attitude of foreign states toward 
China; that is no longer true and in the competition of great states 
for her favors lies China's new diplomatic strength. 
China is in a strong position. Will she be able to take advantage 
of her position? Will she, in the first place, be able to reconcile her 
foreign colleagues to turning over to her the administration of her 
customs service, upon the integrity of which the happiness of so 
many bondholders and the smooth, impartial conduct of trade de-
pend? Will she be able to convince the extraterritoriality commis-
sion2 that the reforms of which so much has been said and written 
'The report of this commission has now been issued and may be obtained from the 
Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., at 25 cents 
per copy. 
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are genuine and that administration, though militarized for the 
Chinese, will be civil to_ the foreigner? No administrators ever had 
a harder task nor a less grateful one. Yet with foreign needs and 
rivalries working for them they may overcome the handicaps o( their 
own domestic difficulties. 
These difficulties date from the republican revolution of I9II , 
when that familiar anomaly of a fundamental change in the estab-
lished order of things being brought about by a comparatively few 
leaders was repeated. Some of the leaders were opponents of the 
old regime on grounds of provincial jealousy, others were converts 
and missionaries in the cause of democracy. Since that date the 
struggle has continued, on the one hand between those who, for 
various reasons, desire the rule of a parliament and those who are 
seeking to restore a strong executive to Peking, and on the other 
between rival groups in both the civilian and military camps, which 
are likely to form alliances with enemy factions in order to defeat the 
purposes of their own proper allies. China is passing through a 
confused period in which the power of government has become dis-
persed. The problem is one of gathering the elements of authority 
together once more. In such a period it is doubly remarkable that 
China not only has not broken apart into fragments but has risen 
considerably in the scale of international values. 
To say that the republican revolution was due to the introduction 
of western ideas and western capital into China is not to impute 
blame to the West for the revolution or its early unfortunate results. 
China was entitled to fair treatment but not to insurance agai.nst the 
inroads of ideas. On the other hand, it is apparent that Western 
interests are called upon to accept all the results of their enterprise 
in China. The lean years come as well as the fat. It is just as 
ridiculous for the ·foreigner to storm against the corruption and 
militarism now rampant in Chinese political life as it is for the Chi-
nese to curse the day that Andrade dropped anchor at Shangchuen. 
With the success of the republican revolution Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
a former viceroy and the creator of China's modern army, was elected 
President. Yuan was in no sense a liberal in politics and his elec-
tion by the newly-assembled parliament was not in accordance with 
their desires. Yuan, however, had the effective northern army at 
his back, he had a faction of northern senators and representatives 
in the national assembly and he was favored by the great powers and 
[II] 
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their bankers. Sun Vat-sen, the chosen leader of the liberals, had 
no personal military following and no unified provincial sentiment 
to rely upon. It was hoped that constitutionalism would develop 
gradually. 
In a sense that hope has been fulfilled. Two attempts to restore 
the monarchy have been thwarted and the movement for a well-
conceived national constitution has been paralleled by movements 
in a number of provinces with the object of supplying themselves 
with constitutions of the Western type. A very considerable body 
of legislation has been drafted in the form of codes and laws, which 
have been applied where possible by the courts though not actually 
passed as yet by a national legislature. The opposition of the mili-
tary leaders to a formal constitution embodying liberal principles 
has been dropped. 
These developments, however, are little more than appearances. 
The actual governing has been done by executives in no sense rep-
resentative of the people. President Yuan Shih-k'ai quarreled with 
the Assembly over the nature of the constitution to be drafted, ex-
pelled the members of the party that opposed him and finaily dis-
solved both the national and the provincial assemblies. He failed, 
however, to make himself emperor. His successor, Li Yuan-hung, 
made an effort to respect the reassembled parliament but was 
thrown out by one militarist effort to restore the Manchus and kept 
out by another clique of generals, while a large part of the redis-
solved Assembly migrated to a more cordial environment in South 
China. In Canton this remnant elected a new President, Sun Vat-
sen, while at Peking a new assembly, pitch-forked into existence, 
chose Hsii Shih-chang, a well-intentioned tool of its paymasters, to 
the presidency. Thus China had two parliaments and two presi-
dents-but no genuine government. Hsii was displaced upon the 
rise of a hostile faction to power and Li Yuan-hung was allowed to 
stop the gap until the political wheel had turned far enough to per-
mit of ousting him in favor of a full -fledged militarist, T'sao K'un. 
T'sao was caught in turn and compelled to spend many months in a 
palace prison while Tuan Ch'i-jui, the puppet of another military 
faction, assumed the pretence of office. Tuan left his post to seek 
safety upon the return of T'sao's friends to power. At present the 
presidential chair is unfilled but the "Old Parliament" is trying to 
convene and it may be anticipated that its members, out of the 
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ripeness-not to use a stronger simile-of their many years of ex-
perience, will be able to name another figurehead. 
In the provinces also civil headship has quite disappeared with the 
destruction of the marvelous influence of monarchy and the clash of 
factions for power which could be obtained only with the help of 
armed forces. The governing system of the provinces, however, 
remains unchanged. Two features of the provincial situation are 
responsible for the evil effects of rule by militarists-the prevalence 
of factions and consequent revolts and the waste of the whole coun-
try's funds. If each tuchiin, as the Chinese entitle the governors, 
were safe in his own province from attack either from the outside 
or from within, no doubt his unified authority would be a desirable 
influence in maintaining order. He might also, in that case, be more 
inclined to remit taxes, duties and other revenues to the central 
government. But the tendency has been to form cliques, and cliques 
within cliques, in an apparently unending series. 
It is important to remember how brief a period, hardly a decade, 
has elapsed since the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Ten years is a very 
brief period in the life of a nation, however significantly it may effect 
the fortunes of individuals. It is so brief that one hardly dares ven-
ture to suggest whether the tendencies in provincial politics are 
toward unification or toward still greater separatism. It would 
seem, however, that the number of factions is increasing and that 
with this increase the number of combinations of factions also is 
greater, with a correspondingly increased list of military leaders 
who possess strength outside their own provinces. Any single leader 
ambitious to control all China is, therefore, likely to find it increas-
ingly more difficult to satisfy the ambitions of those whose support he 
will have to win. On the other hand, he may find it easier to compel 
acquiescence by many minor adventurers than by a few very power-
ful rivals. 
In the face of the omnipresence of civil strife, it is perhaps futile 
to speak of the evolution of political ideas and institutions. It is im-
portant, however, to keep constantly in mind the fact that the item 
of internecine warfare is not characteristic of China, that it is hated 
most bitterly by the res!Jectable classes-the scholar, the farmer, 
the merchant and even by the despairing coolie who never knows 
when he may be caught by a conscription squad and hustled into a 
uniform. That these classes do not revolt is due to their inacquaint-
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ance with political responsibility. China under the empire was 
governed not by men but by the spirit of loyalty to an idea. The 
emperors did not rule but reigned-grandly, universally, mystically. 
Officials were the tangible evidences of that unimagined power. 
But the life of the people was family life, the precepts for their action 
were social precepts. There was no responsibility for the individual 
beyond the locality. There is today no confusion in the localities, 
the villages and the districts move in the ancient grooves. What is 
lacking is the understanding of representative government which 
would transfer the effectiveness of local administration to the pro-
vincial and the national capitals. 
Where so much must be learned before China may expect to have 
a genuine republic it seems logical to begin learning by experimenta-
tion in provincial rather than in national institutions. There is some 
evidence that this idea has made headway in China. There appears 
to be a tendency in certain provinces for the civilian lamb and the 
militarist lion to lie down together. The movement for federalism 
is growing stronger each year. Unfortunately it is felt to involve a 
great sacrifice for a tuchiln to drop out of national politics while a 
man like Governor Yen of Shansi who is anxious to do so is subject 
to constant interference by those who desire his support or resent his 
indifference. Peking is a fatal lure to take a provincial governor 
away from his own proper business. Were it not for the impossi-
bility of foreign states conducting relations with China deprived of 
a national capital it might be better to dispense with Peking. The 
national government is impotent and the provinces would be less 
subject to civil factionalism if the incentive to obtain control of 
Peking were absent. 
Would such a development result in the break-up of China? No 
doubt it would contribute to that misfortune if foreign powers took 
advantage of t:he situation. If the Chinese were left to themselves 
it is probable that no such effects would be felt. In place of a na-
tional political organization China has a universal system of social 
and moral ideas which provides a cultural nationalism of great 
unifying power. In spite of intellectual imports from the West the 
respect for Confucian traditions is intact and it appears to be under-
going a revival of influence among the so-called "Western returned 
students." The Chinese comprehend nationalism in this sense and 
would be opposed to any movement to foster the prosperity of a 
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single section or province at the expense of the whole nation. Dec-
larations of independence have been made from time to time by 
certain provinces or groups of provinces but have aimed rather at 
temporary administrative autonomy than at actual and final sever-
ance of national bonds. 
Although there is little reason to anticipate the withdrawal of 
recognition of the passing Peking juntas by the Powers, the facts 
of the situation appe·ar to indicate the desirability of emphasizing 
and encouraging the development of orderly and prosperous govern-
ments in the provinces rather than of insisting upon something that 
is apparently impossible to obtain at present-a strong central govern-
ment. It is probable that what may appear to be the longer way 
round will prove the shorter way home. As for the national govern-
ment it is not essential that it exercise all the powers that it might 
desirably possess. The development of orderly civil government in 
the provinces will gradually conduce to the strengthening of the 
national government. 
In the interim between no government and strong government at 
Peking what may be expected to happen? It would be fortunate if 
there might be arranged a conciliar executive, representative of the 
real leadership of the country. The alternatives to such a govern-
ment at Peking are two-the "strong man" and the continuance of 
the present situation. After so many failures on the part of what 
appeared to be "strong men" one loses confidence in that remedy. 
On the other hand, it seems very doubtful that the control of the 
capital, especially when that capital is Peking and when the difficul-
ties of handling loan and other negotiations anywhere else are so 
great, ever will cease to be a desideratum of the highest importance. 
If these things be true either Chinese militarists and politicians must 
get together or the civil warfare must continue to accompany politi-
cal development until such a time as the civilian forces of the state 
have overthrown the military and taken the leadership of affairs 
into their own hands. Perhaps this latter alternative is, after all, 
the only logical one to anticipate. 
Two powerful forces are at work to destroy each other in the con-
temporary international relations of China; the older diplomacy of 
the powers that fought the World War and made the Peace of Ver-
sailles together and the new diplomacy of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics. The outcome is still in question. On her side China, 
[ 15] 
although she has not lost but rather has gained standing-in the inter-
national community during the Republican period, is faced by diffi-
cult problems in her relations with a number of powers as she seeks 
to obtain a position of equality with them. The powers with which 
she is particularly engaged today are Japan, Russia, Great Britain 
and the United States. France is inclined to maintain her position 
and to act as an individual in the Far East. Germany is slowly re-
gaining trade and influence. The relations of the first-named powers 
with China dominate the present scene. 
jAPAN 
Japan at the present juncture wears the smooth vestments of con-
ciliation. Deprived of her Shantung acquisitions, her Manchurian 
"Demands" reduced or denationalized, her amour pro pre outraged 
by the immigration act, Japan has given the world an amazing proof 
of civilization in her temperate conduct. She has turned the other 
cheek when she might have been expected to indulge in a frantic 
but futile program of revenge. Her view today is the long view; she 
is willing to wait. And while waiting she is improving her time 
making friends; not as a respector of persons either but wherever 
she finds a welcome. Beyond doubt this friendly attitude has suc-
ceeded. No state today calls Japan enemy, not even China. With 
Russia she is back on terms of tolerance. And she maintains her 
place among her allies and associates of the War period with un-
diminished influence. 
This happy position she has attained within a decade of the 
"Twenty-one Demands"' and the "Nishihara Loans". And during 
that decade her political and economic fabric has been pulled and 
hauled more persistently by reformist elements than at any previous 
period while her problem of after-war readjustment has been a 
serious one. Her accomplishment is remarkable and is to be attri-
buted to the astuteness of her statesmen and the reserve strength, 
physical and mental, of her people. 
Toward China Japan's policy is aimed at bringing about a common 
attitude and a joint program of action in the preservation of the 
territorial and administrative integrity of the two empires. This 
policy is complemented by an unofficial movement among the lit-
• For text see publication No. 45, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division 
of International Law. 
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erary people of Japan toward producing a mutual regard among 
Japanese and Chinese for Oriental culture and mutual action to 
maintain and intensify it. This phase of the situation resembles the 
stimulation by certain groups in England and the United States of 
the mutual recognition of "Anglo-Saxon" customs and ideals. The 
existence of the policy of conciliation is demonstrated by Japan's 
action in restoring Tsingtao and the Shantung railway and other 
privileges, by her withdrawal of troops from Hankow, her surrender 
of her control of the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine "-tacit in her ac-
ceptance of the abolition of spheres of influence in China-and her 
withdrawal of Group V of the Twenty-one Demands, also by anum-
ber of less advertised actions, such as her support of Chinese opposi-
tion to a foreign railway supervisorate, her lukewarm support of 
the Consortium's conditions of financial supervision by lending 
powers, her attitude on certain issues at the Tariff Conference and 
her failure to take vigorous action in a number of incidents in which 
Japanese nationals have been killed or injured, the last of which 
involved an affront to a Japanese warship. All of these circum-
stances and others that might be cited exhibit an attitude the reverse 
of that represented in the Twenty-one Demands and one that must, 
in time, have its effect upon Chinese sentiment. 
Unfortunately, a large part of the favorable influence thus being 
exerted is cancelled in the Chinese mind by Japan's policy in Man-
churia. Just what that policy is it is difficult to summarize in a 
paragraph. The most important of the Twenty-one Demands that 
still survive are those which compelled China to extend the leases of 
Liaotung, with its great ports-Dairen and Port Arthur-and the 
railways of South Manchuria to 99 years. And with the leases are 
• associated Japan's monopoly-in fact if not in name-of the Feng-
tien coal and iron beds. In the Consortium negotiations-the out-
come of which was made a part of the record of the Washington Con-
ference'-Japan was led to water down her expression of railway 
ambitions in Manchuria. But she did not surrender them by any 
means and it is highly significant that the Consortium has not built 
any railways in Manchuria while the South Manchurian Railway 
has been engaged recently in laying rails north from Taonanfu for a 
line which was specifically set down in the negotiations as one to be 
built by the Consortium. Ostensibly the work has been done on 
• Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, International Conciliation, 
No•. 169 and 172. 
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t f Chang Tso-lin the dictator of Manchuria. But to the contrac or ' . 
Ch . ·t must appear as though the ConsortiUm had made a mese 1 • I d h h · h" h 
,. grand-stand play" to get J apanb tokm: u ed er sp ereCsi\;It, m t e 
pooling limits of the associated an s m or er to get una s co~­
fidence, with the understanding that Ja~an would be left alone m 
the actual exploitation of South Manchuna and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia. Meanwhile South Manchuria fails to attract non-Japanese 
enterprises and takes on day by day a more J apanese aspect. Is 
·Japan hoping that a policy of supporting China's wishes elsewhere 
will prove an adequate compensation for South Manchuria? In 
the development of Chinese sovereignty there will not be room for 
the obvious political corollaries of the sweeping economic activities 
which Japan now exercises in that region. Either Japan will have 
to restrict herself to purely economic enterprises or she will have to 
annex the region. So long as the Chinese continue to believe, as 
they do today, that Japan contemplates-given the time and cir-
cumstances-the annexation of a portion of Chinese territory, 
Japan will find it difficult to bring about that cordiality of relations 
which today she is seeking so consistently. 
With Russia Japan is back on a treaty basis and an influential-
but not the most influential-section of Japanese opinion is sup-
porting the establishment of a close accord with the Soviets. The 
success of that group, however, would involve a sacrifice of Japanese 
ambitions, which are no longer satisfied with a free hand in develop-
ing southern Manchuria but contemplate railway building and other 
enterprises in the northerly portions of that great region which were 
recognized by Japan previously as Russia's sphere of activity. Rus-
sia continues to desire that sphere, is in a position to hold it and 
cannot be expected to ally with Japan on any other basis than the 
old one of a division of Manchuria and Mongolia between them. A 
nice problem, therefore, remains to be worked out between Japan 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Undoubtedly Japan places first after the retention of her Man-
churian position the maintenance of the most cordial relations with 
the United States and the British Empire. In this connection the 
outstanding features are the doctrines of the open door and the in-
tegrity of China. Toward making these doctrines effective Japan 
made by far the greatest contribution at the Washington Conference 
in surrendering her Shantung conquests, raising no objections to the 
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operation of the most-favored-nation clause in South Manchuria, 
agreeing to the abolition of spheres and dropping Group V of the 
Twenty-one Demands. Through these provisions Japan aligned 
herself definitely with the powers which have stood most consistently 
for the open door and China's integrity. 
Granting this, Japan's problem is that of maintaining harmonious 
relations with her two great competitors for the trade and exploita-
tion of China while at the same time seeking to establish a Far East-
ern "front" toward the West and to explore the possibilities of her 
new rapprochement with Russia. She has the great advantages over 
Great Britain and the United States of position, of cheaper labor 
and of intimate acquaintance with the civilization of China. If she 
wished she might raise the slogan of race equality. But so far she 
has demanded simply equality for her own people, a sign of her 
difficulty in trying to face both East and West at the same time. 
What she lacks are capital, mineral resources and food for her people. 
The two latter she now obtains from South Manchuria and to retain 
them, on some assured basis, she would probably stake her existence, 
as would any other people which had received recognition as a great 
power. 
Japan is not inclined today toward any type of cooperation with 
other powers designed to supervise or control any feature of Chinese 
administration. In this respect she is, apparently, more solicitous 
of China's administrative integrity than are the other Consortium 
powers. That may be true or it may be that she anticipates greater 
influence for herself if the proposals of international supervision are 
thwarted. At any rate her opposition to any extension of foreign 
supervision is an obstacle to smooth relations with the other powers. 
At the same time it is in accord with China's new nationalism and 
with the vaup.ted anti-imperialism of the Soviets. J This develop-
ment, together with the fact of the Russo-Japanese treaty, finally 
concluded after a prolonged series of negotiations, and the arrival 
of China and Russia upon a working basis, has promoted the sug-
gestion that a Far Eastern bloc is in process of formation having for 
its main object the destruction of Western preferential rights in 
China and the adoption of a unified program toward other powers. 
The considerations already dealt with which have a bearing upon 
such a possibility need not be rehearsed. It is clear that Japan wishes 
to pursue a policy of friendship toward all nations today and that 
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she will not willingly join any combination that would bring her into 
opposition with other countries. She prizes her high place in inter-
national society and her very profitable trade with the United States. 
She has special reasons for seeking the confidence and cooperation of 
China and Russia but it would be no compliment to Japanese di-
plomacy to suggest that it would think of weighing China and Russia 
in the balance as against the British Empire and the United States. 
Nothing but the desperation of a struggle for self-preservation would 
lead her to take that course. At present there is no sign in the sky 
to warn of the approach of such a struggle. 
RusSIA 
To analyze the contemporary position of Russia in the Far East 
is a task rendered no easier by the progress of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics in obtaining recognition from all the great powers 
save the United States.6 If her success in that direction has brought 
her back into international society it has not increased her respect 
for its diplomatic usages nor for the world policies of any of its lead-
ing members, world policies which she, with doubtful consistency, 
asperses. Consequently it is necessary to take account of her de-
clared principles of a world proletarian dictatorship and of opposi-
tion to imperialism while surveying her activities for evidence on 
their relationship to her theories of government and international 
politics. 
The Soviet Government won the esteem and confidence of the 
Chinese people when it surrendered voluntarily those general treaty 
rights-extraterritoriality, customs control, residential concessions, 
and legation guards, which the newly-awakened nationalism of 
China so strongly resents. It is true that the Chinese Government 
had cancelled a number of Russian rights prior to 1924 so that the 
treaty of that year between China and the U. S. S. R. was little 
more than the recognition of faits accomplis. And it may be stated 
with some assurance, in view of the short-sighted encouragement 
given by allied powers during the war period to Chinese action in the 
deportation of Germans and the confiscation of their property, that 
Soviet efforts to retain the treaty rights would have failed to obtain 
the support of the powers. The Soviet Government hardly can be 
blamed for resenting the one-sided abrogation of the privileges in-
See International Conciliation, No. 217, p. 20. 
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herited with the Tzarist treaties, since thereby its bargaining power 
was greatly diminished. But it appears now to be probable that it 
intended to surrender its rights in order that it might use its new 
position of "equality" with China as the platform from which to 
deliver the attack upon the "imperialistic powers" which has ap-
peared as the most striking and consistent feature of its policy in 
China since May 31, 1924. 
Between 1920 and 1926 there has been time for the Chinese to 
appraise the Russian sacrifices and to discover that they do not 
include all that had been anticipated from the manifestoes that were 
published. On the Russian side it has been found that the influence 
of Chang Tso-lin, in control of Manchuria, must be countered before 
arrangements made with a less recalcitrant government at Peking 
can become effective. Relations which seemed to be developing very 
cordially, culminating in the Sino-Russian agreement of 1924, have 
not yet produced a definitive treaty and the likelihood of such a 
treaty being signed is difficult to estimate. In the meantime the 
Soviet Government has employed itself in public incitement of the 
Chinese people to a revolt against the "unequal treaties." The sig-
nificance of the denunciations, the amount of" Soviet gold" distrib-
uted and the influence of Russian civil and military advisers, have 
been exaggerated. The Russian sun and rain have played upon soil 
well-seeded and fertilized to produce an earlier crop. The seed and 
fertilizer have been the general contribution of Western ideas, not 
least of them American. Nor is the crop genuinely Bolshevik, since, 
as the Russians themselves admit, Chinese conditions are not suited 
to the development of communism. China has no exploiting class 
and no great class distinctions, no autocracy in government, land-
holding or the church. She is, however, educationally, industrially, 
and politically backward and she has come recently to ascribe her 
backwardness in large part to the various restrictions placed upon 
her movements by foreign control of her revenues and foreign exemp-
tions from her laws. Wherefore her ready response when a single 
foreign nation surrenders rights which preachers and teachers of 
many foreign institutions in China have taught their students to 
regard as essential to that vague but universally desirable attribute 
which western states call sovereignty. 
As in the case of Japan progress toward a mutually satisfactory 
Sino-Russian regime finds obstacles in the obvious intention of the 
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' Soviets to retain the old Tzarist spheres of influence in Outer Mon-
golia and northern Manchuria. True, Russia recognized in 1924 
"that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China" 
but it is well-understood that the recognition of sovereignty has 
been in the past and may be in the future the disguise put on by a 
more po~erful government in which the actual administrative con-
trol and usufruct of the "protected" territory resides. Russia faces 
Japan for the control of northeastern Asia just as truly today as ever 
before and she would hesitate, even if she were inclined to do so, to 
withdraw her influence from a region bordering her own territory so 
lengthily when the probability of Japanese influence taking its place 
is so strong. But in view of her long-standing interest and influence 
in Mongolia and of the comparative success of her propaganda there 
Russia is not inclined to do more than pay lip-service to the weak 
and distracted Chinese Government. 
As for northern Manchuria the Soviets have dispossessed the sur-
viving Tzarist influence in that region by the simple device of con-
senting to declare with China that "the Chinese Eastern Railway 
is a purely commercial enterprise"-as if it could be made such by 
the mere statement. Although the administrative usurpations of the 
old Russian regime in the railway zone have been swept away there 
is no way by which a great power can operate a railway through 
the territory of a weaker state without exercising political influence 
over the area and the government. Northern Manchuria thus con-
tinues a sphere of Russian influence just as southern Manchuria 
remains a Japanese sphere. China hardly will deal confidently with 
Russia under such conditions. Particularly when the Soviet Govern-
ment, in its anxiety to get into control of the railway, stooped 
to make a separate treaty with Chang Tso-lin, who had, two 
years previously, declared Manchuria independent of the Peking 
Government. 
Russia promises, without date, to withdraw her troops from 
Outer Mongolia and to permit the Chinese Government to redeem 
the Chinese Eastern Railway. It would seem that events may 
render both these promises obsolete. It would seem that there is 
the gravest possibility of circumstances, among which China's in-
ternal confusion would prove the primary factor, promoting a divi-
sion of the spoils, on either a friendly basis or after another con-
flict, between the two powers at present in actual controL of the vast 
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northern marches of China. The disadvantages thus suffered by 
Russia and Japan in their diplomatic relations with China are not 
unique. Rather do they serve to place those countries, in Chinese 
eyes, in the same class with the rest of the imperialistic powers and 
to offset any special advantages of position or similarity of culture. 
GREAT BRITAIN 
The Chinese people respect and fear but do not love the British· 
Upon them they place the major portion of responsibility for forcing 
China to admit western intercourse upon equal terms and they 
think of England today in terms of territories lost or w;ell-nigh lost, 
of government services-the customs and salt administrations-
managed by aliens, of peremptory demands for strict observance of 
treaties,-in short to the Chinese Britain stands as the author of their 
unequal international status and the guide of the Diplomatic Body 
in maintaining it. 
The British reply to this attitude is characteristic: "Let the dead 
past bury its dead." To quote a recent writer: "Whether the 
foreign Powers were justified in breaking down the barriers imposed 
by Chinese ignorance and arrogance is no longer an issue. It was 
settled nearly a century ago." That for the issue of right. And as 
to the issue of advantage the author's next statement is typical: "And 
large and perfectly legitimate commercial interests, from which the 
Chinese have benefited to an even greater degree than the foreigner, 
have been developed in consequence." The first argument over-
looks the fact that no issue is settled by force while the possibility 
of altering the settlement by growth in strength continues to inspirit 
the weaker party. The second is more substantial. But it also is 
defective, as many similar situations have proved, in that it rests 
upon the mistaken assumption that a people will exchange self-
government for financial or other economic advantages. 
The British have been, from the beginning of trade with China, 
at the centre of every argument which concerned the treaty rights of 
foreign states. History repeated itself very recently. The incidents 
involving bloodshed at Shanghai and Canton in May and June, 
1925, have reacted upon the whole foreign community in China but 
principally upon the British. British trade is suffering a boycott 
today at Canton while that with other countries is welcomed. It 
has been the policy of Great Britain to deal firmly with the Chinese, 
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to take no chances, to rely upon the shrewd business sense of the 
people rather than their friendship, to assure the safety of the foreign 
community by intimidation rather than conciliation. Whatever is 
owed to that policy in the past it has produced a legacy of ill-will 
to set beside its benefits. 
Added to her own sins in the eyes of the Chinese were those of 
Japan when, in consequence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Great 
Britain was practically forced into endorsing the aggressive program 
of Japan. W"ith the termination of the alliance began a new period 
in British relations with China, one in which emphasis was to be 
placed upon cooperation with the United States and the actual appli-
cation of the Open Door doctrine. The evidences of the new policy 
on the British side are collaboration with the United States in deter-
mining the scope and terms of the loans that might be made by the 
Consortium and acquiescence in the American policies of holding the 
tariff revision conference and of carrying on the investigation of 
extraterritoriality and Chinese legal administration as provided for 
at the Washington Conference. In all of these projects the British 
Government has gone counter to the loudly expressed views of the 
British commercial community in China, though it has had the 
endorsement of the financial directorates in the City 
British relations with China were rendered more cordial by the 
statement of intention to restore Wei Hai Wei, the British lease in 
northern Shantung, but negotiations to that end have not moved 
rapidly. Opinion among British missionaries in favor of treaty 
renunciation has been gathering force and has been exerted to affect 
the action of the Government. Symptomatic of the realization of 
the issues at stake is the recent action of the Shanghai municipal 
council in voting to recommend the admission of a limited number of 
Chinese member15. Recently the British parliament voted to return 
the unpaid portion of the British share of the Boxer indemnity to 
China. Most significant of all the evidences of the change in the 
British attitude is the refusal of the Government to compel the open-
ing of the port of Canton, closed by the boycott, to British trade, in 
spite of the large losses undergone daily by British merchants through 
its closure. 
The question of Tibet remains an issue between China and Brit-
ain. That little-known region wishes to continue as in the past an 
autonomous vassal state of China. No doubt that relationship would 
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be satisfactory to China if she could feel confident that it would 
remain permanent. But she fears that advantage will be taken of her 
slight control over Tibet and desires to bring the area more com-
pletely under her government. To Britain the interest in Tibet is 
two-fold-trade and security. She desires especially to maintain 
Tibet as a buffer state against Russia and she feels that the present 
status of Tibet is admirably suited to her purposes. In 1912 she 
refused to permit China, under the strong government of Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, to conquer the faction in Tibet that was opposing a closer 
integration of the territory with China. Not, apparently, wishing 
Tibet for herself, she will not permit it to become a portion of China 
proper. The issues involved compose a problem of extreme difficulty 
and one of which no solution appears to be in sight. 
The Chinese realize that the amelioration of their international 
status depends principally upon the attitude of Great Britain, due 
to the preponderance of that country's investment in the trade and 
development of China. What they should also realize is that the 
British argument of mutual advantage is well-founded. In British 
governmental circles it appears already to be recognized that the new 
spirit of China calls for new methods of treatment and that it will 
be necessary to establish a more equalitarian relationship between 
China and capitalist nations before the former profitable era of 
railway and industrial development can be revived. Undoubtedly, 
British interests, like those of America, will prosper most in an at-
mosphere of equal opportunity provided that the Chinese are enabled 
to feel confident that the same equality exists for them as for the 
nations competing for their trade. The British position is a hard one 
today because it appears inevitable that in the impending period of 
restoration of authority the largest foreign interests will suffer the 
most. It is for China to take account of this fact and to moderate 
her demands for immediate emancipation. The important con-
sideration is that the movement be forward and that Britain do not 
appear to be retarding the movement gratuitously. 
THE UNITED STATES 
Americans have not been mistaken in believing that the Chinese 
have regarded them as friends. Without smugness, because out-
siders admit its truth, Americans may claim to have dealt more 
fairly with China than has any other important trading and investing 
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people. That the Chinese of every class and in all parts of the coun-
try know this is evidence of the existence of channels of information 
accessible to the illiterate. The resulting good-will today is less 
evident. The people of China are tending to place America in a com-
mon category with the "imperialistic powers." It is not difficult 
to see why. 
America's good name in China was earned during a period when 
other western countries were seizing her territories and demanding 
extensive spheres of interest. It was John Hay who, while terminat-
ing the movement toward the break-up of China, introduced the 
principle of the open door and in so doing placed the United States 
on an eql!ality with other states in the economic development of the 
country. For two decades the open door policy was destined to lie 
in the pigeon-holes of foreign offices, to the disadvantage of the 
United States financially but to the preservation of American credit 
with the people of China. President Wilson contributed to our 
prestige in withdrawing from the first financial consortium in 1913. 
The change in America's position came when the President changed 
his mind and endorsed our re-entry into the consortium. The 
United States then became the dominant voice in a superpowerful 
combination of capital which was prepared to shut off the greater 
sources of loan funds from China unless that country would authorize 
a degree of foreign financial supervision which it considered both 
objectionable and dangerous. The life of the new consortium has 
been contemporary with a period of almost utter stagnation in 
governmental reorganization, railway-building and other construc-
tive enterprises. For this the United States is held mainly respon-
sible. Apparently China would rather take her chances with the 
powers separately than with the combination represented in the 
Consortium. 
A second explanation of China's new attitude toward the United 
States lies in the definite establishment of the policy of cooperation 
with Great Britain which grew out of the Great War. To China that 
development meant a stiffening of American, as well as a relaxation 
of British policy. Evidence that this was a well-founded anticipa-
tion is forthcoming in American endorsement of the still-born 
plan to place a police force under foreign command over China's 
railways, in American participation in the protection of the Canton 
customs funds against seizure by Sun Yat-sen and in the recent 
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threat to take naval action if the Peiho were not opened to traffic, 
as well as in the absence of criticism of such incidents as occurred last 
year in Shanghai and Canton. The attitude of the Department of 
State has not always been imitated by the representatives of Con-
gress nor by private individuals. 
The United States has been criticized by the Chinese for its 
failure to effectuate the open door policy. At present there is serious 
doubt among them regarding the American Government's attitude 
on the question of Manchuria. Loans of American banks to Japa-
nese quasi-governmental corporations to be used in stimulating 
Japanese immigration to and industrial development in Manchuria 
appear to the Chinese, ignorant of the real attitude of the State 
Department toward such loans, to be evidence of indifference to 
the fate of Manchuria. American trade has not been able to .meet 
Japanese competition, the Consortium has made no progress toward 
railway development and there appears to be, in general, a wait-
and-see policy regarding the region. It would appear that the lack 
of regular relations with Russia is a felt deficiency in the American 
diplomatic equipment for affecting the progress of Japanese control 
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. It is not sug-
gested that the American Government desires to hinder the develop-
ment of Japan. America's relations with China are conditioned 
primarily by the universal desire of the American people for peace 
and friendly relations with Japan. What is desired is to accommo-
date Japan within the limitations of the open door and integrity of 
China policies. The record of the Washington Conference contains 
very little information on the problem of Manchuria but what it 
contains indicates that the government of the United States still 
regards Manchuria as a part of China. 
In spite of these changes in the American situation it is probable 
that the United States has not altogether lost its special position 
in the confidence and good-will of the Chinese people. What was 
lost at Versailles was regained at Washington. American leadership 
has been marked in the effort to effectuate the tariff treaty and the 
resolution on extraterritoriality. The sentiment of American mis-
sionaries has offset the views of the associated American chambers of 
commerce in China. And the absence of such physical evidences of 
interference as settlements, leases, spheres, and protectorates con-
tinues to give to America a margin of advantage in Chinese eyes. 
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The American position is not an easy one. There is danger of 
falling between two stools-interest in the strengthening of China 
and in retaining her friendship on the one hand and cooperation with 
Great Britain and other powers on the other. To fail in the former 
desideratum would be to destroy a tradition and to lose an impor-
tant advantage in the race for trade and investment opportunities, 
while to be isolated would mean to be compelled to meet vigorous 
international competition and to lose an opportunity for leadership. 
It will require the most astute diplomacy to keep the confidence of 
both sides. 
CONCLUSION 
The present situation of China points to the close dependence of 
a country's foreign relations upon domestic conditions. It is in 
spite of those conditions, not because of them, that China has re-
gained territory and authority which had been in the possession of 
other states. Were she today a well-knit and orderly community 
there can be no question of her immediate success in obtaining general 
recognition of equality. 
The Chinese leaders are unwilling to wait upon the advent of 
internal sobriety to secure the advantages of external sovereignty. 
The question that arises is one of the possibility of compromise, of 
each side consenting to give way in part for the sake of a gradual 
and peaceful deliverance from the deadlock that now exists. 
Present tendencies run toward such a development. All of the 
powers having special privileges in China are showing a cordial 
attitude toward an improvement in her position. At the same time 
they are insisting firmly upon the preservation of protections for 
foreign lives and property. It would seem that a people as eminently 
reasonable as the Chinese would not deny the justice of that insist-
ence. There is need of greater confidence, however, in the good in-
tentions of their foreign friends. This confidence should develop 
if the powers continue to show toward China the present attitude of 
non-interference and patience. 
RECENT EVENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL 
Since the completion of this article events of considerable, if not 
of major, importance have occurred in China and in that country's 
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relations with other states. While it is quite impossible to speak 
conclusively of anything political in contemporary China interest 
attaches to the incidents that reveal tendencies in the undoubted 
progress of that great ci~ilization toward its wonted calm and toward 
a position of dignity among the nations. 
China has been without a president ever since Tuan Ch'i-jui left 
office in April, 1926, at the demand of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. Shifting 
cabinets have been kept in being with difficulty. Among the fac-
tions contending for supremacy in North China none has been strong 
enough to control a presidential selection nor conciliatory enough 
to acquiesce in a coalition choice. Consequently a logical enough 
development has taken place in that the cabinets have represented 
the dominant forces and the capital has had a coalition, conciliar 
executive made up of the proxies of the more influential tuchun. 
Only the militarists who for the time being pretend to be somewhat 
friendly toward each other have, however, been represented. 
Probably love's labor is lost in attempting to determine the con-
stitutional aspects of the current situation in Peking The so-called 
permanent constitution, which came into effect on October 10, 1923, 
was declared suspended by the provisional government of Tuan in 
1924. If it be granted-what would be difficult to prove-that the 
constitution had been constitutionally established there. arises the 
question of the authority of a provisional executive to suspend it. 
Furthermore, now that Tuan has passed from the scene it may be 
assumed that his acts of an irregular character have passed with 
him. Assuming then that the "permanent" constitution is of legal 
effect, the executive authority rests in the cabinet. Article 76 of 
the constitution reads: "In the event of the vice-president vacating 
his post whilst the presidency is vacant, the cabinet shall officiate 
for the president." To be sure one may ask how the cabinets are 
appointed but if one examines credentials too closely business must 
stop altogether. 
Of greater importance at present than the constitutional issue is 
the actual territorial extent of the authority exercised at the national 
capital. A success long-sought by Sun Yat-sen, the southern Kuo-
mintang (nationalist party) leader, was attained during the summer 
of 1926 by his followers. By a combined effort of arms and rhetoric 
the Cantonese forces drove through Hunan into Hupeh and captured 
the triplet cities Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow. This remarkable 
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success has given emphasis to the long-standing ineffectiveness of 
Peking authority south of the Yangtze river and has raised appre-
hensions lest the drive be continued to the capital itself. Between 
the Cantonese and that goal however, lie four substantial armies-
that of Wu Pei-fu, centering in Honan, of Sun Chuan-fang, based 
on Kiangsu, of Chang Tsung-chang, tupan of Shantung and of 
Chang Tso-lin, now garrisoning Peking and moving toward central 
China. These four armies are loosely allied to maintain control of 
China north of the Yangtze and of the provinces immediately south 
and west of its mouth. Canton has an ally in Feng Yu-hsiang, whose 
army has not recovered from its recent defeat by Chang Tso-lin 
and is at present scattered through the far interior regions of Shensi, 
Kansu and inner Mongolia. Prospects for Cantonese success to the 
northward appear slight, but it must be remembered that the alle-
giance of the soldiery is easily swayed. Nothing would be less sur-
prising than a wholesale flocking of the troops of Wu and Chang to 
the banners of Feng and Canton. A revision of alliances favorable 
to the southern faction is another possibility. Wu and Chang Tso-
lin are not good friends and Sun Clman-fang is interested principally 
in holding his place in Kiangsu. 
Should the Kuomintang secure the capital the prospects of order 
and constitutional government would, it seems probable, improve. 
This party has stood from the beginning for liberal ideas and it is 
hardly likely that militarist elements could control it once it gained 
power and international recognition. It is, and has always been, the 
most nationalistic section of Chinese opinion and it demands the 
recognition of China's equality most loudly of all. But foreign 
powers would have no need of their special treaty position if the 
Chinese Government were ordered and unified. 
Events in Manchuria also have had a direct bearing upon the prob-
lem of unification. In the fall of 1925 Feng Yu-hsiang broke the 
truce with Chang Tso-lin and very nearly succeeded in ousting him 
from Manchuria. Chang was saved by the action of Japan in for-
bidding hostilities within the zone of the South Manchurian rail-
way. Since that time he has, in turn, attacked Feng and driven him 
out of Peking. Perhaps it is not too wide of the mark to suggest 
that had Feng been successful the Cantonese forces, his allies, would 
now be in control of the capital. It appears, furthermore, that if 
the republicans are to control China they must first come to an un-
derstanding with Japan regarding Manchuria. 
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DIPLOMATIC 
China has made greater progress toward international equality 
within recent months than the results of the Tariff Conference and 
the investigation of the extraterritoriality commission wotdd sug-
gest. It will be recalled that the former was convened in Peking 
on October 26, I925, in order to carry out the Washington Con-
ference provisions for a revision of Chinese treaty tariffs. It was 
adjourned sine die on July 3, I926, the Chinese delegates having been 
forced out by the turn of national politics. The lack of unity among 
the Chinese factions greatly impeded the progress of the Conference 
and but one significant decision was taken prior to adjournment. 
By unanimous vote of the delegates it was resolved that China should 
be recognized as possessing customs autonomy from January I, 1929, 
China, on her part agreeing concurrently, but not by way of prior 
condition, to abolish likin, the internal tax on goods in transport, on 
the same date. Considerable variation was evidenced in the views 
of the Chinese and the foreign delegates as to the interim tariffs 
to be levied, the classification of goods and the use of the revenue. 
There were also points of difference in the proposals of the foreign 
delegates. Upon adjournment the latter issued a statement to the 
effect that they were unanimously desirous of proceeding with the 
work of the Conference at the earliest moment that the Chinese 
delegates should find themselves in a position to resume discussion. 
The Commission on Extraterritoriality, also set in motion by a 
Washington Conference agreement, completed its work on September 
16, 1926, and presented a fair report of conditions observed, giving 
much greater attention to the Chinese courts and administration 
than to the extraterritorial regime. The report does not recommend 
the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality nor elaborate an in-
terim scheme. It does, however, contribute toward progress by sug-
gesting reforms both in the practice of extraterritorial privileges 
and in the legal, judicial, and legislative institutions of China and 
their administration. It looks forward to a progressive relaxation 
of the extraterritorial regime and refrains from assuming a patroniz-
ing attitude. The report of the commission is a very interesting one 
which deserves reading in full. It was signed by all the delegates, 
Dr. Wang Chung-hui signing for China with reservations as to cer-
tain portions but not as to the recommendations. 
In September, I926, the "mixed court" at Shanghai, which has 
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been, since 19II, entirely under foreign control, was returned to the 
Chinese. Hereafter the judges will be designated by the Chinese 
authorities while the foreign consuls will sit as assessors only. 
Since the Great War the Chinese have shown _an increasing repug-
nance toward dealing with the treaty states as a group. In harmony 
with this attitude was the action taken on November 6, 1926, by 
Dr. Wellington Koo, acting premier and foreign minister, in abro-
gating the general treaty with Belgium. Belgium was offered the 
opportunity to negotiate a new treaty but declined to do so and is 
insisting that the question of the right of China to abrogate the 
treaty be brought before the Permanent Court of International 
Justice for decision. China is a signatory of the optional clause of 
the Court protocol but claims that the issue involved is political and 
should be dealt with by the Council or Assembly of the League of 
Nations. She has asked Japan also for revision of the Sino-Jap-
anese treaty which became subject to revision in October, 1926, 
and has received a somewhat favorable but indefinite reply. 
There are evidences within recent months that the larger powers 
are giving plenty of thought to the further improvement of their 
relations with China. It seems to be true, despite such incidents as 
the intervention at Taku and the shelling, by British gunboats, of a 
Yangtze town, that the forces of moderation in every country have 
gained the upper hand in the decision of policies toward China. But 
what policy should be adopted? That is the real problem, one that 
is badly complicated by the lack of unity in so vast a country. To 
relinquish the treaty rights by negotiation with the Peking Govern-
ment; to arrive at settlements with that government respecting the 
Chinese debts; to arrange for new loans; what will such decisions 
mean to Canton, to Shanghai, to Tsinanfu, to Mukden and other 
regional capitals? Naturally they will all willingly accept relin-
quishments of restrictions but will they all as readily carry out the 
engagements entered upon as the basis of a new relationship? 
It appears that the powers are recognizing that they must, in some 
way, obtain the contacts which their essential interests demand 
with those portions of China that do not recognize the constitutional 
authority of Peking. Both Mr. MacMurray, the American minister 
to China and Sir Miles Lampson, newly appointed British minister, 
have had interviews with the leaders of the southern faction. There 
are rumors of a recognition of that faction as a belligerent govern-
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ment. The termination of the Canton boycott against British trade, 
which occurred on October 10, 1926, has rendered British-Canton re-
lations much more tolerable. On December 18 the British minister 
at Peking delivered a memorandum to the ministers of the states 
represented at the Washington Conference, in which a series of 
suggestions for a cooperative policy is recommended. or the most 
part these might have been borrowed from the statesmanlike ut-
terance of Mr. MacMurray upon closing his highly interesting round-
table discussion on China at Williamstown in 1924. Epitomized 
they amount to: (a) abandonment of foreign tutelage over China's 
economic and political development; (b) recognition of China's 
tariff autonomy upon her promulgation of a new tariff act; (c) 
disclaimer of any intent to force foreign control upon China; (d) 
declaration of readiness to negotiate on treaty revision and other 
questions; (e) immediate, unconditional grant of surtaxes agreed 
to at the Washington Conference; (f) a constructive policy, adapted 
to present circumstances, pending establishment of a real govern-
ment. The last item is most significant, indicating as it does that 
the powers must give up the earlier assumption that all reform, 
domestic and international, must wait upon the establishment of a 
strong central government. 
What is needed today is a modus vivendi by which practical re-
sults may be attained without injury to the integrity of China. 
Formal recognition, attended by the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, with Hankow, Mukden, or any other Chinese area, is not 
to be considered. On the other hand the recognition of Peking 
should not be allowed to interfere with cordial and helpful relations 
between recalcitrant regions and foreign states. There is little need 
to fear the break-up of China since the strength of national feeling 
is likely to offset temptations to pursue a separatist program. The 
time has arrived for the powers to launch a liberal policy, to reject 
every suggestion of intervention, to set a course without regard to 
treaty rights, to recognize that a new nation is being born. China 
will come her half of the way. 
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SYLLABUS ON RECENT CHINESE POLITICS AND 
DIPLOMACY 1 
A. ExtRATERRITORIALITY AND CHINESE LAw 
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Why established; foreign states exercising extraterritorial rights; attitude 
of Chinese toward its establishment 
Scope of extraterritoriality; taxation; police regulations; land; mines and 
factories; inland commerce; missions; residence concessions. 
Foreign consular courts; judicial capacity of consuls; number of consular 
courts; variety of law applied; sources of law for American courts in China; 
treatment of Chinese plaintiffs; appeals; difficulties in obtaining evidence; 
misuse of rights to protect foreign and Chinese criminals; attitude of 
Chinese plaintiffs toward consular courts. 
The "mixed court" at Shanghai; original basis of establishment; devel-
opment of foreign control; effects of Revolution of I9I I; return to Chinese 
control; other mixed courts in China. 
Relation of extraterritorial rights to protection of foreigners against 
military interference and banditry. 
II. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA 
Essential character of Chinese law under the empire; criminal law; civil 
law; punishments; prisons. ~ 
Legal reform; the new codes; foreign influence in the codes. 
The judicial system; extent of application of the reforms; character 
of the "new" judges; independence of the judiciary; modern prisons. 
The Chinese bar. 
III. THE QUESTION OF ABOLITION 
Earlier proposals regarding modification of the extraterritorial regime; 
treaties of I902 and I903i Versailles Conference; Washington Conference. 
Loss of rights by Germans; by Austrians; by Russians; treatment of these 
nationals in Chinese courts; attitude of their governments; effect upon 
their trade. 
Comparison of situation in China with that in other countries at the date 
of abolition: Japan; Turkey. 
Proposals for a transitional period; present system in Egypt; in Siam. 
1 Prepared for the Los Angeles Institute of Public Affairs, by Professor Harold S. Quigley. 
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Opinions of different foreign groups in China: missionaries; merchants; 
British opinion; Japanese opinion. 
Work of the vVashington Conference commission in the investigation of 
foreign and Chinese legal administration; extent of that commission's 
authority; its report. 
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B. PoLITICAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
I. IMPERIAL POLITICS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1911 
Dominant elements under the empire; monarchy: councils and boards; 
civil service based upon literary qualifications; "squeeze"; nepotism; lack 
of separation of powers; excess of officials; actual provincial autonomy; 
strong local sentiment involved in the family system; light taxation. 
Reasons for the Revolution: the Empress Dowager; the radicals; Sun 
Yat-sen; the moderates; K'ang Yu-wei; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; foreign conces-
sions and provincial jealousy. 
II. EFFECTS OF THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION 
Establishment of a "Provisional Constitution"; imperfect attempt at a 
cabinet system; no provision regarding provincial government. 
Destruction of an ancient monarchy; absence of traditional centre of · 
power; civil service on new basis. 
Rise of struggle between military and civilian forces-between tuchun 
and parliament; the constitutionalists; Kuomintang; Chinputang; feder-
alism; the tuchun or tupan. 
III. ERA OF YUAN SHIH·K1AI (I9I4-I9I6) 
Yuan the heir of the greater viceroys; his character and methods; treat-
ment of parliament; possibility of accommodation; influence of foreign 
loans. 
Yuan's "Constitutional Compact"; his governing machinery; the mon-
archy movement; death of Yuan. 
IV. 11 NORTH" VS. 11 SOUTH" (I9I6-I924) 
Restoration of parliament; Li Yuan-hung; Tuan Ch'i-jui; issue of en-
trance into the Great War; second dissolution of parliament. 
Break-up of China into autonomous regions; no united "North" or 
"South" in fact; peregrinations of parliament; revival of civil war; elec-
tion of Sun Yat-sen as president of "South" China; Sun vs. Ch'en. 
The military cliques: Peiyang; Anfu; Chihli; Fengtien; Paoting; Loy-
ang; struggle for supremacy; President Hsii Shih-chang. 
Civilian cliques and pseudo-parties; Chiaotung clique; Yen Chiu-hsi; 
Cheng Hsueh-hui, etc. 
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V. THE LATEST PHASE (1924-1926) 
Rupture of the Chihli clique; Ts'ao K 'un, Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-
hsiang vs. Chang Tso-lin; Ts'ao K'un elected president; the "Permanent 
Constitution"; outstanding features of the new constitution: fed ralism, 
national supremacy, cabinet government, judicial \eview: suspension of 
the constitution by Tuan Ch'i-jui; the new draft constitution. 
Alliance of Sun Yat-sen and Chang Tso-lin against the Chihli triumvi-
rate; outbreak of civil war in 1924; treachery of Feng Yu-hsiang and rout 
of Wu Pei-fu; :the "Little Emperor" ousted from the palace; Sun Yat-sen 
in Peking; his death there; Ts'ao K'un impri~oned and Tuan Ch'i-jui 
installed as provisional president; the "Reorganization Conference"; 
the "Senate"; the proposed "Citizens' Conference." 
Feng attempts to overthrow Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, but fails ; 
alliance of Wu Pei-fu and Chang T so-lin; Feng driven out of Peking; dis-
appearance of civil government in the capital; Wu and Chang on the 
teeter-board. 
The situation at Canton; charter government; Russian influence; con-
quest of South. 
Possible tendencies toward provincial independence; meaning of inde-
pendence as used by provincial or regional dictators; importance of Chinese 
cultural homogeneity; prospects for a "strong man": Is a "strong central 
government" essential in China? 
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C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS 
I. MAJOR ECONOMIC GROUPS 
Conditions of the agricultural ciass; land-holding; effect of new ideas 
upon village life; influence of country gentry upon political affairs. 
Development of a labor movement; guilds and unions; strikes; use of the 
boycott; situation at Canton; relation of labor conditions to the military 
situation; child labor. 
Position of the merchant class; banking; manufacturing; mining; ship-
ping; influence of commercial clubs; degree of independence shown toward 
military governors. 
II. FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
The Chinese customs service: establishment and importance of the 
inspectorate-general; British vs. Japanese claims to that office; deposit of 
customs funds. 
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The Chinese tariff: limitations involved in the 5 per cent treaty rates as 
compared with tariffs of other countries. 
Development of Chinese commerce: trends; distribution among foreign 
countries; effort to develop port at Whampoa; possibilities of Tsingtao; 
effects of civil war upon commerce and internal trade; likin: nature and 
effects. 
Peking tariff conference: Chinese proposals; American and Japanese 
proposals; autonomy resolution; issue of loan security; likin issue; interim 
arrangements. 
Railways: types; how financed; foreign part in management; foreign 
investment in railways; American efforts to obtain railway concessions; 
the Hukuang lines; the Sianfu-Haichow line; depreciation suffered due to 
civil warfare. 
The Chinese Eastern Railway: original method of financing; interest of 
France; economic value of road; effect of loss of South Manchurian line 
upon its profits; status under new Sino-Soviet treaties. 
The Consortium: the apparent change of American policy; attitude of 
Japan; plans for loans; difficulties with the Chinese government and peo-
ple; question of foreign participation in administration; possibilities of 
private loans; of cooperation with Chinese bankers; issue of security. 
Japan in Manchuria: extent of concessions for minerals; railway-conces-
sions; new railways under construction or contemplated; soya beans; oil 
manufacture; Chinese immigration. 
Other foreign investments: mines; manufactures; growth of Japanese 
cotton mills in China; river and coastal shipping; banks; papers; trade 
branches. 
III. LOANS 
Extent and character of Chinese·foreign loans; extent of domestic loans; 
how far secured; outstanding unsecured loans; nature of security for for-
eign loans; outlook for additional security; desirability of further loans. 
Defaulted loans; Nishihara loans; American bankers' loans. 
Sources of Chinese revenue; relation of revenue to budget requirements; 
possibilities of increase. 
Plans for funding unsecured obligations; prospects for a reorganization 
of Chinese finances. 
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D. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF CHINA 
I. PHASES IN SINO-FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Period of conflict: reasons for Chinese opposition to regular intercourse 
with foreigners. 
Period of submission: losses of territory; unilateral treaties; establish-
ment of foreign control over various services. 
Period of foreign domination: foreign garrisons; indemnities; leases and 
spheres; danger of break-up. 
Period of nationalism: ideas of democracy ; the" renaissance"; demands 
for treaty revision; boycotts; anti-foreignism; regional demands for 
recognition. 
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II. CHINA AND JAPAN 
Earlier Japanese dependence upon Chinese culture; quicker comprehen-
sion of ultimate results of forced relations with West; failure to propose a 
joint policy of defence! decision for imperialism at China's expense; the 
Sino-Japanese war; absorption of Korea. 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance; Russo-Japanese war; acquisition of leases 
of Kwantung, the South Manchurian railway and natural resources of 
South Manchuria; fate of the open door doctrine in South Manchuria; 
accommodation with Russia. 
Twenty-one Demands; Japan's" Monroe Doctrine for Asia"; the Secret 
Treaties; Shantung settlement at Versailles; its reversal at Washington. 
Militarism vs. economic penetration; policy of conciliation; recent 
RuS'so-Japanese relations in Manchuria; railways, coal, iron, and beans. 
Japan at the Tariff Conference; views on abolition of extraterritoriality; 
favorable attitude toward treaty revision; possibilities of a Far Eastern 
"bloc." 
III. CHINA AND RUSSIA 
Extent of common boundary; influence of Mongol blood toward common 
understanding; relative indifference of China in earlier periods to Mongolia 
and Manchuria; tripartite treaty. 
Russian territorial gains at China's expense: Siberia; maritime province; 
IIi; Russian railway concessions in Manchuria; scope of Russian railway 
designs; administration of railway zones; Russia's application of the open 
door doctrine. 
The Russo-Asiatic bank: railway and bank politics. 
China and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics: delay in recognition; 
Soviet manifestoes surrendering treaty rights; disposition of Russian share 
of Boxer indemnity; treaties of 1924; Ambassador Karakhan; Soviet tac-
tics vs. the "imperialistic" powers; Chinese friendship for the Soviets; the 
Chinese Eastern Railway; Mongolia; attitude of Chang Tso-lin. 
IV. CHINA AND GREAT BRITAIN 
Importance _of British part in establishing treaty relations; Hongkong; 
British spheres of interest; Wei-hai-wei; railways; mines; customs inspec-
torate; salt; trade; Chinese feeling toward the British. 
British attitude at the Washington Conference; subsequent attitude 
respecting extraterritoriality and the tariff regime; views of British mis-
sionaries; British editors in China. 
The "Shanghai" case: report of commission of inquiry; later proposals 
regarding Chinese representation on the municipal council; situation in 
Hongkong and Canton; status of British trade and investments. 
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British participation in the Peking Tariff Conference and the work of the 
extraterritoriality commission; disposition of British share of Boxer 
indemnity. 
The problem of Tibet. 
V. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
Importance of the open door doctrine and the "integrity" policy to 
China; resulting development of American trade; disappointment of China 
at American interpretations of responsibility; attitude of the United States 
respecting Manchuria. 
American missionaries: educational and medical work in China; in-
fluence upon American policy of the groups therein represented; the Boxer 
indemnity. 
The "Shantung Question" in Sino-American relations; settlement at 
Washington; the Washington Conference and American policy in general. 
American part in bringing Washington Conference treaties into effect; 
proposals at the Peking Tariff Conference. 
American cooperation with other powers the major desideratum; the 
Taku incident. 
VI. CHINA AND FRANCE 
French influence and interests in South China; in the Chinese Eastern 
Railway; missionary relations; trade; failure of the Banque Industrielle 
de Ia Chine. 
France at the Washington Conference; the "Gold Franc" case; disposi-
tion of French share of Boxer indemnity. 
France and the "Shanghai" case. 
Participation of France in tariff and extraterritoriality investigations. 
VII. CHINA AND GERMANY 
German policy in Kiao-chao; friendly attitude of the Chinese toward the 
Germans; deportations forced by the powers; loss of concessions and other 
treaty rights. 
Post-war revival of German trade; basis of present Sino-German 
relations. 
VIII. CHINA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
Membership in the Council; loss of membership; efforts toward reinstate-
ment; classification for contribution to budget; arrears; re-election in 1926. 
The League and the opium traffic: conferences of 1924-5; withdrawal 
of the Chinese and American delegations; new Indian policy of restriction. 
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Chinese participation in the International Labor Organization; in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. 
The proposed plan of League assistance toward Chinese financial reor-
ganization; hostile attitude of the Chinese. 
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NOTE 
The following letter, dated December 22, 1926, has been received from 
J. Merle Davis, Executive Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hon-
olulu, Hawaii: 
I wish to call your attention to a serious error of statement con-
tained in the Preface of the International Conciliation .Series 
pamphlet of March, 1926. On page 5, in the late Judge Thomas 
Burke's speech describing the Institute of Pacific Relations which 
met in Honolulu, in July, 1925, the following words appear, "At 
one time it seemed as if the Chinese representatives had made up 
their minds to withdraw from the conference, but on more careful 
consideration they did not do so." The word, "Chinese," in this 
sentence is an error and should be corrected to read, "Japanese." 
Since at your request I read the proof of this pamphlet before 
going to press, I feel a measure of responsibility for the above-
mentioned error and will be grateful if you can give this statement 
a prominent place in an early issue, in order that justice may be 
accorded our Chinese Institute members. 
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International Conciliation appeared under the imprint of the American 
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